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I. Introduction 
 
 The election of Donald Trump as President has started to impact the legal landscape.  
There have been substantive changes already reflected in rulings of administrative agencies with 
the National Labor Relations Board reversing a decision on the standard for determining 
bargaining units and the Department of Education changing course on Title IX guidance. Other 
changes may be on the horizon with potentially substantial modifications to the law governing 
unionization of faculty and graduate students in the private sector and the constitutionality of 
agency fee in the public sector. Finally, the new political and social environment has led to an 
increase in the harassment and discipline of faculty members, resulting in First Amendment and 
other legal challenges.   
The most significant change may arise in the Supreme Court. In 2016 the Supreme Court 
accepted a case challenging the constitutionality of agency fees in the public sector. (See 
Friedrichs infra.) The Court appeared poised to find agency fees unconstitutional when Justice 
Antonin Scalia died. Left with only eight justices, the Court issued a one sentence 4-4 decision 
that upheld the lower court’s decision and the status quo on agency fee. Trump appointed Justice 
Neil Gorsuch to fill Scalia’ seat, and he will likely adopt a conservative position. The issue is now 
before the Supreme Court in Janus v. AFSCME. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on 
February 26, 2018 and the argument went largely as expected. Because none of the justices 
appeared to depart from their expected position, the oral argument reinforced the view that the 
Court will likely rule that the collection of agency fees in the public section is unconstitutional.   
In the private sector, the coming change in the makeup of the Board will likely bring into 
question the future of the Board’s rulings in a number of important cases. With new appointments 
now filling two of three vacancies on the National Labor Relations Board and the likelihood that 
the third vacancy will be filled by another conservative nominee, the Board may revisit some of 
its important rulings regarding faculty, particularly its Pacific Lutheran University (2014) decision 
on the test used to determine whether religiously-affiliated institutions are exempt from NLRB 
jurisdiction, and its Columbia University (2016) decision that graduate student employees 
(teaching assistants and research assistants) have the right to unionize. 
The increase in scrutiny of faculty actions, and the attendant online harassment of faculty, 
has also created new legal challenges. In some instances, faculty have been disciplined for their 
activities, drawing First Amendment or contract based challenges, and these cases are winding 
their way through the courts.   
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II. First Amendment and Speech Rights 
 
A. Garcetti / Citizen Speech 
 
Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) 
In this Supreme Court case the Court held unanimously that a public employee’s speech 
that may concern their job, but is not ordinarily within the scope of their duties, is subject to First 
Amendment protection. The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that Lane did not speak 
as a citizen when he was subpoena’d to testify in a criminal case, finding that Eleventh Circuit 
relied on too broad a reading of Garcetti. Garcetti does not transform citizen speech into employee 
speech simply because the speech involves subject matter acquired in the course of employment. 
The crucial component of Garcetti then, is, whether the speech “is itself ordinarily within the scope 
of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”  
Edward Lane was the director of Community Intensive Training for Youth (CITY), a 
program operated by Central Alabama Community College (CACC). Lane in the course of his 
duties as director conducted an audit of the program’s expenses and discovered that Suzanne 
Schmitz, an Alabama State Representative who was on CITY’s payroll, had not been reporting for 
work. As a result Lane terminated Schmitz’ employment. Federal authorities soon indicted 
Schmitz on charges of mail fraud and theft. Lane was subpoenaed and testified regarding the events 
that led to the termination of Schmitz at CITY. Schmitz was later convicted. Steve Franks, then 
CACC’s president, terminated Lane along with 28 other employees under the auspices of financial 
difficulties. Soon afterward, however, “Franks rescinded all but 2 of the 29 terminations—those 
of Lane and one other employee”. Lane sued alleging that Franks had violated the First 
Amendment by firing him in retaliation for testifying against Schmitz.  
 The District Court granted Franks’ motion for summary judgment, on the grounds that the 
individual-capacity claims were barred by qualified immunity and the official-capacity claims 
were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirmed, holding 
that Lane spoke as an employee, not a citizen, because he acted in accordance to his official duties 
when he investigated and terminated Schmitz’ employment.  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of 
Appeals as to “whether public employees may be fired—or suffer other adverse employment 
consequences—for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the course of their ordinary 
job responsibilities”. 
The Court held that Lane’s speech was entitled to First Amendment protection. The Court 
explained that under Garcetti, the initial inquiry was into whether the case involved speech as a 
citizen, which may trigger First Amendment protection, or speech as an employee, which would 
not trigger such protection. In Lane the Court provided a more detailed explanation of employee 
versus citizen speech, and expanded the range of speech that is protected. The Court explained that 
6
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 13 [2018], Art. 40
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss13/40
7 
 
“the mere fact that a citizen's speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his public 
employment does not transform that speech into employee--rather than citizen--speech. The 
critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope 
of an employee's duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.” And the Court found that 
“Lane’s sworn testimony is speech as a citizen.”  
The Court further determined that Lane’s speech was protected under the First 
Amendment.  First, Lane’s speech about the corruption of a public program is “obviously” a matter 
of public concern and further that testimony within a judicial proceeding is a “quintessential 
example” of citizen speech. Second, the employer could not demonstrate any interest in limiting 
this speech to promote the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees or 
“that Lane unnecessarily disclosed sensitive, confidential, or privileged information.” 
The Court held that Franks could not be sued in his individual capacity on the basis of 
qualified immunity. Under that doctrine, courts should not award damages against a government 
official in their personal capacity unless “the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,” 
and “the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Because of the 
ambiguity of Eleventh Circuit precedent at the time of the conduct, the right was not “clearly 
established” and thus the test unsatisfied to defeat qualified immunity. Lane’s speech is entitled to 
First Amendment protection, but Franks is entitled to qualified immunity. As a result of this case 
the right is clearly established and is now the standard. 
 
B. Faculty Speech 
 
Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014) 
 In this important decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinforced the 
First Amendment protections for academic speech by faculty members. (Important note, a 
previous opinion by the Ninth Circuit in this case dated September 4, 2013 and published at 729 
F.3d 1011 was withdrawn and substituted with this opinion.) Adopting an approach advanced in 
AAUP’s amicus brief, the court emphasized the seminal importance of academic speech.  
Accordingly, the court concluded that the Garcetti analysis did not apply to "speech related to 
scholarship or teaching,” and therefore the First Amendment could protect this speech even when 
undertaken "pursuant to the official duties" of a teacher and professor.  
Professor Demers became a faculty member at Washington State University (WSU) WSU 
in 1996 and he obtained tenure in 1999.  Demers taught journalism and mass communications 
studies at the university in the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication.  Starting in 2008, 
Demers took issue with certain practices and policies of the School of Communication. Demers 
began to voice his criticism of the college and authored two publications entitled 7-Step Plan for 
Improving the Quality of the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication and The Ivory Tower 
of Babel. Demers sued the university and claimed that the university retaliated against him by 
lowering his rating in his annual performance evaluations and subjected him to an unwarranted 
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internal audit in response to his open criticisms of administration decisions and because of his 
publications. 
The district court dismissed Demers’ First Amendment claim on the ground that Demers 
made his comments in connection with his duties as a faculty member. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 
U.S. 410 (2006). Demers appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The AAUP joined with the Thomas 
Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression to file an amicus brief in support of 
Demers.  The amicus brief argued that academic speech was not governed by the Garcetti analysis, 
but instead was governed by the balancing test established in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 
US 563 (1968). The Ninth Circuit agreed and issued a ruling that vigorously affirmed that the First 
Amendment protects the academic speech of faculty members.  
The Ninth Circuit held that Garcetti does not apply to "speech related to scholarship or 
teaching" and reaffirmed that “Garcetti does not – indeed, consistent with the First Amendment, 
cannot – apply to teaching and academic writing that are performed ‘pursuant to the official duties’ 
of a teacher and professor.”     
The Ninth Circuit held specifically that the 7-Step plan was “related to scholarship or 
teaching” within the meaning of Garcetti because “it was a proposal to implement a change at the 
Murrow School that, if implemented, would have substantially altered the nature of what was 
taught at the school, as well as the composition of the faculty that would teach it.” The court thus 
considered whether the Demers pamphlet was protected under the Pickering balancing test. 
Academic employee speech is protected under the First Amendment by the Pickering analysis if 
it is a (1) matter of public concern, and (2) outweighs the interest of the state in promoting 
efficiency of service. The court held that the pamphlet addressed a matter of “public concern” 
within the meaning of Pickering because it was broadly distributed and “contained serious 
suggestions about the future course of an important department of WSU.” The case was remanded 
to the district court, however, to determine (1) whether WSU had a “sufficient interest in 
controlling” the circulation of the plan, (2) whether the circulation was a “substantial motivating 
factor in any adverse employment action, and (3) whether the University would have taken the 
action in the absence of protected speech. 
 
Wetherbe v. Tex. Tech Univ. Sys., 669 F. Appx 297 (5th Cir. 2017); Wetherbe v. Goebel, 
No. 07-16-00179-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1676 (Mar. 6, 2018) 
In this case, the Fifth Circuit held that a professor’s public statements opposing tenure were 
protected by the First Amendment. Professor James Wetherbe sued his employer, Texas Tech 
University, and the current and former deans of the business school where he taught. Wetherbe 
claimed that the University and the deans violated the First Amendment by retaliating against him 
for publicly criticizing tenure in the academy. The district court granted Defendants' motion to 
dismiss, holding that Wetherbe's speech was not protected by the First Amendment as it did not 
involve a matter of public concern because "[t]enure is a benefit that owes its existence to, and is 
generally found only in the context of, government employment."   
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The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that Wetherbe’s statements criticizing 
tenure were protected.  The court explained that "Whether speech addresses a matter of public 
concern is to be 'determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement.'" As to the 
content of the speech, the court found that “Because these articles focus on the systemic impact of 
tenure, not Wetherbe's own job conditions, the content of the speech indicates that the speech 
involves a matter of public concern.”  As to the form and context of the speech, the court 
emphasized the publicity and media coverage surrounding Wetherbe’s statements, and that the 
speech consisted of articles Wetherbe published in various media outlets.  The court also rejected 
arguments by the university that Wetherbe’s speech was made in the course of performing his job, 
as there was no reason to infer that writing articles on tenure or speaking to the press are part of 
Wetherbe's job duties.  
By contrast, in an earlier case, the Fifth Circuit had found that the First Amendment did 
not protect Wetherbe's decision to reject tenure or his personal views on tenure.  Wetherbe v. Smith, 
593 F. App'x 323, 327-29 (5th Cir. 2014). In that case, the Fifth Circuit found that because 
Wetherbe’s statements had been made solely to university employees during the course of his 
interview for a position, and had not been made publicly, they were not speech on a matter of 
public concern and therefore were not protected by the First Amendment. These two cases together 
demonstrate that it is not just the content of the speech that is important, but the forum and audience 
at which the speech is directed.  
In Wetherbe v. Goebel, No. 07-16-00179-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1676 (Mar. 6, 2018), 
a parallel case before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh District Court of Texas at Amarillo, the 
sole issue on this appeal was whether Wetherbe’s speech was a matter of public concern. The court 
reversed the dismissal of this state law claim and remanded the case back to the trial court further 
proceedings finding, “Because the continued value of academic tenure was a matter of public 
concern, conceptually distinct from any speech related to Appellant’s prior litigation or disputes 
with the university.” 
 
Buchanan v. Alexander, et al., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4479 (M.D. LA Jan. 10, 2018) 
 In this case, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment with 
prejudice. Plaintiff, Teresa Buchanan, a tenured professor at Louisiana State University (LSU), 
alleged that LSU infringed upon her freedom of speech, academic freedom, and procedural and 
substantive due process rights when LSU’s Board of Supervisors terminated her employment after 
finding that her remarks about marriage and sex to students—made while training students for 
preschool to third-grade instruction—violated the university’s Policy Statements on Sexual 
Harassment. Plaintiff also brought a facial and as-applied constitutional challenge to LSU’s sexual 
harassment policy, arguing that it was overbroad and lacked an objective test for offensiveness. 
The court found that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims failed either because they were time-
barred or because qualified immunity protected Defendants’ objectively reasonable actions, 
notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff failed to show that her remarks were protected by the 
9
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academic freedom exception to Garcetti and did not involve a matter of public concern. The court 
found, “Plaintiff has utterly failed to present any summary judgment evidence establishing how 
her conduct and language related in any way to assignments, instruction, and education of 
preschool and elementary teachers.” The court further found that LSU’s sexual harassment policy 
was constitutional, both facially and as-applied to Plaintiff, since its language required conduct to 
be objectively severe and examples provided in the policy illustrated that conduct must be 
sufficiently severe and pervasive. Last, the court found that Plaintiff was afforded procedural and 
substantive due process to satisfy constitutional standards leading up to her termination.   
 
C. Union Speech 
 
Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. College, 770 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2014), and No. 13 C 
7950 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2016)  
This case arose from the termination of Robin Meade, an adjunct professor and active union 
officer at Moraine Valley Community College, who was summarily dismissed after she sent a 
letter criticizing her college’s treatment of its adjunct faculty. The case resulted in several 
substantive decisions from the district court and one from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 
In the appeals court case, the Seventh Circuit greatly enhanced constitutional protection for 
outspoken critics of public college and university administrators. It reinforced and enhanced recent 
and congenial decisions in two other federal circuits in cases from Washington (Demers) and 
North Carolina (Adams). The court specifically relied on a sympathetic view of the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in the Garcetti case, expressly invoking the justices’ “reservation” of free speech 
and press protections for academic speakers and writers. The three-judge panel 
unanimously declared that an Illinois community college could not summarily dismiss an adjunct 
teacher for writing a letter criticizing the administration, at least as long as the issues she had raised 
publicly and visibly constituted “matters of public concern.” 
The federal appeals court also noted that even a contingent or part-time teacher had a 
reasonable expectation of continuing employment at the institution and therefore a protected 
property interest. The appellate court ruled that Robin Meade, the outspoken critic and active 
union officer, was “not alone in expressing concern about the treatment of adjuncts.” The panel 
added that “colleges and universities across the country are targets of increasing coverage and 
criticism regarding their use of adjunct faculty.” In this regard, the court broke important 
new ground not only with regard to academic freedom and professorial free expression, but even 
more strikingly in its novel embrace of the needs and interests of adjuncts and part-timers. 
On remand, the district court initially denied motions for summary judgment by both the 
College and Meade. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (N.D. Ill. March 3, 2016). However, on October 17, 
2016 in an unpublished decision the district court vacated this ruling, granted Plaintiff’s motion 
for summary judgment, and denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Meade v. Moraine 
10
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Valley Community College, No. 13 C 7950 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2016). The court ruled in Meade’s 
favor on both First Amendment and Due Process grounds, and explained. 
 
In regard to the First Amendment retaliation claims, the Seventh Circuit made it 
clear that the letter in question (Letter) involved a matter of public concern. The Seventh 
Circuit indicated that this court need only address the remaining two issues of “whether the 
speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the retaliatory action, and whether the 
defendant can show that it would have taken the same action without the existence of the 
protected speech.” Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll., 770 F.3d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 
2014). . . . . The undisputed facts in this case clearly show that the Letter was the motivating 
factor behind the actions taken against Meade, and the College has not pointed to sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the College would have taken the 
same action without the existence of the protected speech. The College admits that it took 
action against Meade because of her statements in the Letter. The College has not pointed 
to other evidence showing that it had an alternative basis to terminate Meade’s 
employment. . . .Therefore, Meade’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability 
on the First Amendment retaliation claim is granted. 
In regard to the due process claim, the Seventh Circuit has found that Meade has 
shown that she has a protected property interest. Once again, after discovery and the filing 
of dispositive motions, the undisputed facts show that Meade did not waive any right to 
due process, and that she was not accorded a proper hearing. Meade justifiably declined to 
appear at a prospective hearing that did not afford Meade an opportunity to obtain counsel. 
The undisputed facts show that Meade was deprived of her protected interest and that the 
deprivation was done is a way that violated due process standards. . . .  Therefore, Meade’s 
motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the due process claim is granted. 
 
After this decision was issued Moraine settled with Professor Meade. 
Meagher v. Andover Sch. Comm., 94 F. Supp. 3d 21 (D. Mass. 2015) and 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1100 (D. Mass. Jan. 6, 2016)  
In this case, a U.S. District in Massachusetts ruled that speech made by a teacher as a union 
representative was protected under the First Amendment finding that the Garcetti test did not apply 
because speech was not a part of her normal employment duties as clarified in Lane v. Franks.  
This case arose out of the September 2012 termination of the plaintiff, Jennifer Meagher 
("Meagher"), from her employment as a tenured teacher at Andover High School ("AHS") in 
Andover, Massachusetts. Prior to her termination, Meagher and other members of the teachers' 
union, the Andover Education Association ("AEA" or "Union"), were involved in contentious 
negotiations with the Andover School Committee over a new collective bargaining agreement. In 
addition, AHS was engaged in the process of seeking re-accreditation pursuant to the standards 
established by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges ("NEASC"). The 
11
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accreditation process centered on a self-study, which required teachers and administrators at AHS 
to conduct evaluations of the school's programs, prepare separate reports addressing one of seven 
accreditation standards, and present the reports to the faculty for approval. Under the NEASC 
guidelines, each report required approval by a two-thirds majority vote of the faculty. It was 
undisputed that Meagher was discharged from employment, effective September 17, 2012, 
because she sent an email to approximately sixty other teachers in which she urged them to enter 
an "abstain" vote on the ballots for each of the self-study reports as a means of putting the 
accreditation process on hold and using it to gain leverage in the collective bargaining negotiations. 
Meagher alleged that the decision to terminate her for writing and distributing the email to her 
colleagues constituted unlawful retaliation for, and otherwise interfered with, the exercise of her 
First Amendment right to engage in free speech.  
The fundamental issue was whether Meagher's email to her colleagues is entitled to 
protection under the First Amendment. Pursuant to Garcetti v. Ceballos, her speech would be 
protected if she were speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern rather than pursuant to 
her duties as a teacher when she distributed the communication, and if the value of her speech was 
not outweighed by the defendants' interest in preventing unnecessary disruptions to the efficient 
operation of the Andover public schools.  
In reviewing the facts, the court found that Meagher was speaking as a citizen. 
 
The record on summary judgment establishes that Meagher was speaking as a citizen, and 
not an employee of the Andover School Department, when she distributed the June 10, 
2012 email at issue in this case. There is no dispute that Meagher wrote the email on her 
personal, home computer, and distributed it to her colleagues using her personal email 
account. Moreover, there is no dispute that she sent the communication during non-
working hours, that she contacted the recipients using their personal email accounts, and 
that the email concerned issues that were addressed in the press and triggered considerable 
discussion among members of the local com-munity. The substance of the email, in which 
Meagher advocated use of the "abstain" option on the ballots for the self-study reports as a 
means of delaying the NEASC re-accreditation process and gaining leverage in the contract 
dispute between the Union and the ASC, would not have given objective observers the 
impression that Meagher was representing her employer when she communicated with her 
colleagues. . . . Accordingly, the record demonstrates that Meagher was working in her 
capacity as a Union activist rather than in her capacity as a high school English teacher, 
when she distributed the communication in question. 
 
94. F Supp. 3d at 38. 
The court also found that the value of Meagher's speech outweighed any interest that the 
defendants had in preventing unnecessary disruptions and inefficiencies in the workplace. 
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Therefore, the court found that Meagher’s speech was protected and that her termination violated 
her rights under the First Amendment.  
The suit and many of Meagher’s claims were ultimately adjudicated or resolved. While the 
First Amendment lawsuit was pending the Commonwealth Employment Relations Board  
("CERB" or  "Board") issued its decision  in  connection with an unfair labor practices charge filed 
by the union, finding Meagher's  termination  was  in  response to protected concerted  activity  
and  that  her  employer  had discriminated against her based on her union activity in violation of 
Massachusetts law. The School Committee was  ordered  to  reinstate  Meagher  to  her  teaching 
position  at  AHS  and  to  compensate  Meagher  for  all losses  she  had  suffered, if  any, as  a  
result  of  the unlawful action. In addition, before the trial in the First Amendment lawsuit, the  
parties  settled  Meagher's  claim  for $100,000.00,  leaving  to  the  court  the  issue  of reasonable 
attorneys' fees and costs, which it assessed at $183,691.97.  Meagher v. Andover Sch. Comm., 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1100 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2016) 
 
D. Exclusive Representation 
 
Hill v. SEIU, 850 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2017) cert denied (Nov. 13, 2017); D'Agostino v. 
Baker, 812 F.3d 240 (1st Cir. 2016) cert denied (June 13, 2016); Jarvis v. Cuomo, 660 
Fed. Appx. 72 (2d Cir. 2016) cert denied (Feb. 27, 2017)   
These cases involved lawsuits in which anti-union plaintiffs challenged the long 
established rights of unions to exclusively represent employees in public sector bargaining. In a 
decision written by former Supreme Court Justice David Souter, the First Circuit firmly rejected 
the plaintiffs’ claims. The court explained, that non-union public employees have no cognizable 
claim that their First Amendment associational rights were violated by the union acting as an 
exclusive bargaining agent with the state. In D’Agostino v. Baker, 812 F.3d 240 (1st Cir. 2016), 
the court explained,   
 
. . . that result is all the clearer under Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. 
Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 104 S. Ct. 1058, 79 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1984), which ruled against First 
Amendment claims brought by public college faculty members, professional employees of 
a state education system, who challenged a legislative mandate that a union selected as 
their exclusive bargaining agent be also the exclusive agent to meet with officials on 
educational policy beyond the scope of mandatory labor bargaining. The Court held that 
neither a right to speak nor a right to associate was infringed, id. at 289; like the appellants 
here, the academic employees in Knight could speak out publicly on any subject and were 
free to associate themselves together outside the union however they might desire. Their 
academic role was held to give them no variance from the general rules that there is no 
right to compel state officials to listen to them, id. at 286, and no right to eliminate the 
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amplification that an exclusive agent necessarily enjoys in speaking for the unionized 
majority, id. at 288. 
 
The court also rejected the Plaintiff’s attempts to use the recent Supreme Court decision in 
Harris v. Quinn, 189 L. Ed. 2d 620 (U.S. 2014) to justify their claims. Plaintiffs sought review 
by the Supreme Court, which was rejected on June 13, 2016. D'Agostino v. Baker, 195 L. Ed. 2d 
812 (U.S. June 13, 2016). 
Similarly, in Hill v. SEIU, 850 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. Ill. Mar. 9, 2017) the National Right to 
Work Legal Defense Foundation asserted that the state and public sector unions violated plaintiffs 
First Amendment rights in enacting and enforcing legislation allowing home child-care providers 
within a state-designated bargaining unit to elect an exclusive representative to bargain collectively 
with the state.  On March 9, 2017, the Seventh Second Circuit soundly rejected this argument, 
explaining, “under Knight, the IPLRA's exclusive-bargaining-representative scheme is 
constitutionally firm.” On November 13, 2017, the Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s writ of 
certiorari. Hill v. SEIU, 850 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 
E. Agency Fee 
 
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 
851 F. 3d 746 (7th Cir. March 21, 2017) cert granted 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4459 (U.S. 
Sept. 28, 2017) 
 In this case, anti-union forces are making their second attempt to overrule the Supreme 
Court’s 1977 precedent in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which held that agency fees are 
constitutional under the First Amendment. At issue in the case is whether nonmembers of unions, 
who share in the wages, benefits, and protections that have been negotiated into a collectively 
bargained contract, may be required to pay their fair share for the cost of those negotiations. The 
National Right to Work Committee, which is behind the case, is asking the Court to find that such 
fair share fees violate the First Amendment.  
 AAUP filed with the National Education Association (NEA) an amicus brief in the US 
Supreme Court arguing that the payment of agency fees by nonmembers in public sector collective 
bargaining unions is constitutional. The NEA/AAUP amicus brief explains that the US Supreme 
Court’s historical interpretation of the First Amendment gives the government, in its role as 
employer, significant authority to manage the public sector workplace. Where state laws provide 
for public sector unionization, public employers have strong interests in ensuring robust collective 
bargaining, including agency fees as a fair and equitable way to distribute the costs of collective 
bargaining among all the employees who benefit. Evidence shows that maintaining a robust 
collective bargaining system advances the government’s interest in providing high quality public 
services. The amicus brief discusses studies showing that unionization in public schools and 
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universities is linked to improving the quality of education and of working relationships within 
educational institutions. 
 The Supreme Court held oral arguments in the case on February 26, 2018. Because none 
of the justices appeared to depart from their expected position, the oral argument reinforced the 
view that the Court will likely rule that the collection of agency fees in the public section is 
unconstitutional. A decision is expected by the time the Court’s term ends in late June 2018. If the 
Supreme Court holds that agency fees are unconstitutional, it would likely be effective the day it 
is issued. 
 
Jarvis v. Cuomo, 660 Fed. Appx. 72 (2d Cir. 2016) cert denied (Feb. 27, 2017) 
 This case involved disputes regarding the refund of agency fees collected from non-union 
members who were partial public employees under the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. 
Quinn, 189 L. Ed. 2d 620 (U.S. 2014).  The plaintiffs were individuals operating home child care 
businesses. They are covered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris which ruled that 
collection of agency fees from these individuals violated to the First Amendment.  
After the Harris decision was issued, the Union and the employer negotiated a new 
collective bargaining agreement that did not require the deduction of agency fees. The union also 
rebated to the plaintiff’s agency fees that were collected after the Supreme Court issued its decision 
in Harris. The plaintiffs continued to prosecute their suit arguing that the Union was obligated to 
rebate them for agency fees paid prior to the Court’s decision in Harris.  
The second circuit found that the Union was not obligated to make such a reimbursement 
as the union relied in good faith when it collected the agency fees prior to Harris. The Court 
explained, “In obtaining the challenged fair share fees from plaintiffs, CSEA relied on a validly 
enacted state law and the controlling weight of Supreme Court precedent. Because it was 
objectively reasonable for CSEA "to act on the basis of a statute not yet held invalid," defendants 
are not liable for damages stemming from the pre-Harris collection of fair share fees.” Jarvis v. 
Cuomo, 660 Fed. Appx. 72 *76, (2d Cir. N.Y. 2016).  Similarly, the district court in Illinois 
rejected a claim for payment of agency fees collected for services performed before the Harris 
decision was issued on June 30, 2014. Winner v. Rauner, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175925 (N.D. 
Ill. Dec. 20, 2016). 
 
 
III. Academic Freedom and FOIA/Subpoenas 
 
Energy & Environment Legal Institute v. Arizona Board of Regents, Case No. 2CACV-
2017-0002 (Ariz. App. Ct., Second App. Div., Sept. 14, 2017) (unpublished)  
 In this decision the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected attempts by a “free market” legal 
foundation to use public records requests to compel faculty members to release emails related to 
their climate research. In an amicus brief in support of the scientists, the AAUP had argued that 
15
Nisenson: Legal Issues in Higher Education
Published by The Keep, 2018
16 
 
Arizona statute creates an exemption to public release of records for academic research records, 
and that a general statutory exemption protecting records when in the best interests of the state, in 
particular the state’s interest in academic freedom, should have been considered. The appeals court 
agreed and reversed the decision of the trial court that required release of the records and returned 
the case to the trial court so that it could address these issues. 
 This case has a long and tortured history, with two lower court decisions, two appeals court 
decisions, and three AAUP amicus briefs. It started with a lawsuit filed by Energy & Environment 
Legal Institute, a “free market” legal foundation using public records requests in a campaign 
against climate science. Previously, E & E (then American Tradition Institute) sought similar 
records of University of Virginia faculty members Michael Mann and others, which the Virginia 
Supreme Court, with AAUP filing an amicus brief supporting the scientists, rebuffed. Here, E & 
E’s public records requests targeted two University of Arizona faculty members, climate 
researchers Professors Malcolm Hughes and Jonathan Overpeck. E & E counsel has stated that the 
suit was intended to “put false science on trial” and E & E vowed to “keep peppering universities 
around the country with similar requests under state open records laws.” 
 The case has moved between the trial court and the Appeals Court of Arizona several times. 
In this appeal, the trial court had initially ruled that the records should be disclosed. As the Appeals 
Court decision explained, 
 
 the trial court determined the e-mails sought by Energy & Environment Legal   
 Institute (E&E) that had been characterized as “prepublication  critical analysis,   
 unpublished data, analysis, research, results, drafts, and commentary,” were subject  
 to release under A.R.S. § 39-121, concluding that Arizona Board of Regents   
 (Board) had “not met its burden justifying  its decision to withhold the subject   
 emails.”  
 
 The University appealed, and AAUP submitted an amicus brief that advanced two 
arguments. First, the trial court did not properly apply a section of the public records law which 
specifically protected the research records of the university faculty, and thus created a privilege 
for these records. Second, the trial court did not properly apply a general section of the public 
records law which required that the court consider the best interests of the state, and particularly 
the importance of academic freedom in research.  As the brief explained, “Courts should consider 
the best interests of the state to maintain a free and vital university system, which depends on the 
protection of academic freedom to engage in the free and open scientific debate necessary to create 
high quality academic research. Where the requests seek prepublication communications and other 
unpublished academic research materials, as in the case at bar, compelled disclosure would have 
a severe chilling effect on intellectual debate among researchers and scientists.” 
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 The Appeals Court agreed with both of these arguments, and reversed the decision of the 
trial court. Importantly, the Appeals Court specifically found there was an academic privilege 
created by the statute: 
  
 . . . . the trial court’s decision concludes that “the creation of an academic privilege
 exception . . . is a proposition more properly made to the legislature rather than the 
 courts.”  Section 15-1640, although it is not titled as an “academic privilege,” grants an 
 exemption from Arizona public records law for certain “records of a university.” The trial 
 court’s comment seems to demonstrate that the court did not consider the application of § 
 15-1640 and was not aware the legislature had already created an academic privilege. 
  
 The Appeals Court also found that, as argued by AAUP, the trial court had failed to address 
whether the best interests of the state warranted protecting these research records. Because the trial 
court had not properly applied the statutory protections available to the scientists, the Appeals 
Court reversed the trial court’s decision requiring release of the records, and remanded the case to 
the trial court for it to issue a decision fully addressing these protections. 
 
Glass v. Paxton (University of Texas at Austin), appeal docketed, No. 17-50641 (5th Cir. 
July 24, 2017) 
 This case involves an appeal of a lawsuit filed by several faculty at the University of Texas 
contesting a policy that had been promulgated as a result of a Texas campus carry law. Texas 
passed a “campus carry law” that expressly permits concealed handguns on university campuses, 
and in 2016 the University of Texas at Austin issued a Campus Carry Policy mandating that faculty 
permit concealed handguns in their classrooms. Several faculty filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Texas alleging that enforcement of the Campus Carry 
Policy profoundly changes the educational environment in which Plaintiffs teach in violation of 
the First Amendment.  The District Court dismissed the case, holding that the faculty did not have 
standing to sue because they had not proven that they had been harmed by the law or university 
policy. The faculty appealed and the AAUP joined with the Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun 
Violence and the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence in an amicus brief filed in the Fifth Circuit 
in support of the faculty members’ appeal.  
 The brief explains that college campuses are marketplaces of ideas, and that the presence 
of weapons has a chilling effect on rigorous academic exchange of ideas. The brief argues that the 
policy (and the law pursuant to which the policy was created) requiring that handguns be permitted 
in classrooms harms faculty as it deprives them of a core academic decision and chills their First 
Amendment right to academic freedom. 
 The brief further explains that the deleterious impact of guns on education is widely 
recognized by university administrators and faculty, whose conclusions are confirmed by a 
significant body of social science research. The brief argues that the “decision whether to permit 
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or exclude handguns in a given classroom is, at bottom, a decision about educational policy and 
pedagogical strategy. It predictably affects not only the choice of course materials, but how a 
particular professor can and should interact with her students—how far she should press a student 
or a class to wrestle with unsettling ideas, how trenchantly and forthrightly she can evaluate student 
work. Permitting handguns in the classroom also affects the extent to which faculty can or should 
prompt students to challenge each other. The law and policy thus implicate concerns at the very 
core of academic freedom: They compel faculty to alter their pedagogical choices, deprive them 
of the decision to exclude guns from their classrooms, and censor their protected speech.”  
 
McAdams v. Marquette University, pet. to bypass Ct. of Apps. granted, 379 Wis. 2d 438 
(2018)  
 This pending appeal arose from a blog post written by Dr. McAdams, a tenured professor 
at Marquette University, which criticized the university, other university faculty, and the actions 
of a graduate student/instructor. The administration proposed terminating Dr. McAdams. The 
Faculty Hearing Committee found that the opinions expressed by Dr. McAdams were protected 
by academic freedom, but that parts of the blog post, such as naming the graduate 
student/instructor, warranted a one to two-semester unpaid suspension, but not termination. 
Marquette University President Michael Lovell accepted the recommendation of the suspension, 
but also imposed a penalty, as a condition of Dr. Adams’s reinstatement, requiring Dr. McAdams 
to write a statement of apology and admission of wrongdoing. Dr. McAdams’s reasonable refusal 
to do so resulted in his de facto termination without due process or opportunity to contest the 
administration’s action.  
 Dr. McAdams brought suit and claimed, inter alia, that Marquette violated his due process 
rights and his right to academic freedom. The trial court granted Marquette’s motion for summary 
judgment. Dr. McAdams appealed the trial court’s decision and the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
agreed to bypass the Court of Appeals and to hear the case immediately. The AAUP recently filed 
an amicus brief in the Wisconsin Supreme Court in support of Dr. John McAdams, who seeks to 
overturn the trial court’s decision to deny his motion for summary judgment. The AAUP amicus 
brief explained that its policy documents and standards guaranteeing faculty rights of academic 
freedom and due process must protect faculty (like Dr. McAdams) from discipline when they 
express controversial views. 
 On the academic freedom issue, the trial court opined, “In short, academic freedom gives 
a professor, such as Dr. McAdams, the right to express his view in speeches, writing and on the 
internet, so long as he does not infringe on the rights of others.” The amicus brief explained that 
“Such a formulation of limiting academic freedom to ‘views’ that do ‘not infringe on the rights of 
others’ vastly undermines academic freedom. The nature of offering opinions, particularly 
controversial ones, is that they may prompt vigorous responses, including assertions that the right 
of others have been infringed. Views and opinions should be subject to debate, not to limitations 
based on claims that the expression of views infringes upon the rights of others. Adding such a 
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component will only serve to limit the openness and breadth of the views expressed in academia, 
compromising essential rights of academic freedom.” The amicus brief urged the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court to adopt AAUP standards to interpret academic freedom policies, including those 
at Marquette, as protecting faculty from discipline for extramural speech unless the university 
administration proves that such speech clearly demonstrates the faculty member’s unfitness to 
serve, taking into account his entire record as a teacher and scholar. As AAUP standards explain, 
“Extramural utterances rarely bear upon the faculty member’s fitness for continuing service.” 
 The amicus brief also argued that Marquette violated Dr. McAdams’s due process rights 
by unilaterally imposing a new penalty that required Dr. McAdams to write a statement of 
apology/admission as a condition of reinstatement. This severe sanction would compel Dr. 
McAdams to renounce his opinions, a fundamental violation of his academic freedom. It also 
amounted to a de facto termination that was imposed in contravention of the Faculty Hearing 
Committee’s recommended lesser penalty. 
 
City and County of San Francisco v. Donald J. Trump et. al., No. 3:2017cv00485-WHO 
(N.D. Cal. 2017), County of Santa Clara v. Donald J. Trump, et. al., No. 3:2017cv00574-
WHO (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-17478 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2017) 
 This pending appeal involves a challenge to a January 25, 2017 Trump administration 
Executive Order 13768 “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,” which 
declared that “(i)t is the policy of the executive branch to . . . (e)nsure that jurisdictions that fail to 
comply with applicable Federal law do not receive Federal funds, except as mandated by law.” 
Section 9 implements that policy by commanding executive branch officials to strip state and local 
governments deemed to be “sanctuary jurisdictions” of their eligibility “to receive grants.” The 
City and County of San Francisco filed suit in the US District Court for the Northern District of 
California against President Trump and other federal officials, alleging that the Executive Order 
violated the separation of powers doctrine, the Tenth Amendment, and due process guarantees. On 
April 25, 2017, the District Court entered a nationwide preliminary injunction against the 
Executive Order determining that the City and County of San Francisco and County of Santa Clara 
had pre-enforcement standing to protect hundreds of millions of dollars of federal grants from the 
unconstitutionally broad sweep of the Executive Order. The AAUP joined an amicus brief 
submitted to the Ninth Circuit in support of the permanent injunction that enjoins the US 
government from enforcing Section 9 (a) of Executive Order 13768. The amicus brief argued that 
upholding the Executive Order would create a precedent that would enable the Trump 
administration to extend the Executive Order to apply to colleges and universities, and addresses 
the harms that would flow from overturning the permanent injunction.  
 The amicus brief further argued that such an extension would negatively impact colleges’ 
and universities’ ability to carry out their public mission (“This public mission extends to private 
and nonprofit colleges and universities as well. In the United States, colleges and universities 
explicitly see themselves as “conducted for the common good.”  AM. ASSOC. OF UNIV. 
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PROFESSORS, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure), and their 
interests in developing a diverse student body, “ . . .  A diverse student body breaks down 
stereotypes, “promotes learning outcomes,” and “‘better prepares students for an increasingly 
diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.’” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 
330. (quoting from amicus brief); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210. Diversity contributes to a robust 
exchange of ideas, exposure to different cultures and the acquisition of competencies necessary in 
our increasingly diverse society and closely connected world. Id. at 2211.” The brief also 
emphasized the harms caused by the Executive Order—undermining the critical interest that our 
society has in the education of all its residents regardless of immigration status; threatening higher 
education’s constitutional interest in educational independence to create the sort of diverse student 
body that is critical to the intellectual and academic life of the community; devastating university 
research opportunities by withdrawing federal funding for failure to participate in federal 
immigration enforcement; and penalizing students’ opportunities for higher education by 
withdrawing federal student scholarship funding. 
 
 
IV. Tenure, Due Process, Breach of Contract, and Pay 
 
A. Tenure – Breach of Contract 
 
Matter of Monaco v. N.Y. Univ., 145 A.D.3d 567, 43 N.Y.S.3d 328 (N.Y. App. Div., 
2016) 
Professors Marie Monaco and Herbert Samuels, New York University Medical School, 
had their salaries significantly slashed after NYU arbitrarily imposed a salary reduction policy.  
The Professors believed that this policy violated their contracts of employment, as well as NYU’s 
handbook which, in its definition of tenure, “guarantees both freedom of research and economic 
security and thus prohibits a diminution in salary.” NYU argued that it was not even bound by the 
Faculty Handbook. On December 15, 2016, the Supreme Court of the State of New York, 
Appellate Division, First Department found that Professors Monaco and Samuels sufficiently 
alleged that the policies contained in NYU’s handbook, which, “form part of the essential 
employment understandings between a member of the Faculty and the University have the force 
of contract.”  
 
Beckwith v. Pa. State Univ., 672 F. App’x 194 (3d Cir. 2016) 
Plaintiff, a tenure track faculty, brought suit against the university and alleged that the 
university breached her employment agreement when the university terminated her before the end 
of her employment agreement. Plaintiff’s offer letter described her position as “tenure-eligible” 
with tenure being a six-year process although consideration for earlier tenure was possible based 
on performance yet was also subject to the universities’ policies regarding faculty appointments. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Plaintiff failed to overcome 
Pennsylvania’s presumption of at-will employment because she failed to show that there was “an 
express contract between the parties for a definite duration or an explicit statement that an 
employee can only be terminated “for cause.’” The court emphasized that because Plaintiff’s 
employment agreement (nor any other document that was incorporated by reference) failed to 
establish a term of years, Plaintiff did not meet her burden on the breach of contract claim.   
 
B. Tenure – Constitutionality  
 
Vergara v. State of Cal., 246 Cal. App. 4th 619, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. App. 2d 
Dist., May 3, 2016) 
 In this case, the Court of Appeal of California issued a decision overturning a ruling by a 
California state court judge that found that California statutes providing tenure protections to K–
12 teachers violated the equal protection provisions of the California constitution. The case arose 
from a challenge, funded by anti-union organizations, to five California statutes that provide 
primary and secondary school teachers a two-year probationary period, stipulate procedural 
protections for non-probationary teachers facing termination, and emphasize teacher seniority in 
reductions of force. The AAUP submitted an amicus brief which argued that the challenged 
statutes help protect teachers from retaliation, help keep good teachers in the classroom by 
promoting teacher longevity and discouraging teacher turnover, and allow teachers to act in 
students’ interests in presenting curricular material and advocating for students within the school 
system. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the statutes 
themselves did not create equal protection violations, so they are not unconstitutional. 
 The challenged statutes in the California Education Code establish: a two-year 
probationary period during which new teachers may be terminated without cause, due process 
protections for non-probationary teachers facing termination for cause, and procedures for 
implementing budget-based reductions-in-force. After an eight-week bench trial, Los Angeles 
Superior Court Judge Rolf Michael Treu, in a short sixteen-page opinion containing only 
superficial analysis, adopted the plaintiffs’ theories in full, striking down each challenged statute 
as unconstitutional. In doing so, Judge Treu improperly used the “strict scrutiny” standard and 
failed to adequately consider the substantial state interest in providing statutory rights of tenure 
and due process for K–12 teachers in the public schools. 
 The AAUP filed an amicus brief in support of tenure. The AAUP has a particular interest 
in defending the due process protections of tenure at all levels of education. The brief, primarily 
authored by Professor Charlotte Garden, an expert in labor law and constitutional law and litigation 
director of the Korematsu Center for Law & Equality at Seattle University, advanced two 
substantive arguments. First, the brief explained that by helping to insulate teachers from backlash 
or retaliation, the challenged statutes allow teachers to act in students’ interests in deciding when 
and how to present curricular material and to advocate for students within their schools and 
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districts. In so doing, the brief recognized the distinction between the academic freedom rights of 
primary and secondary school teachers and those of professors in colleges and universities. 
Second, the brief argued that students are better off when good teachers remain in their classrooms, 
and the challenged statutes promote teacher longevity and discourage teacher turnover. 
 A three judge panel in the Court of Appeal reversed the earlier judgment, finding that the 
tenure, dismissal, and layoff statutes themselves did not cause equal protection violations, so they 
are not unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the negative evidence related to inexperienced 
teachers and poor and minority students was the result of external factors such as administrative 
decisions, and were not directly caused by the text of the statutes. In other words, the problems 
were caused by how people are implementing the statutes, not by the system the statutes create. 
Additionally, the court decided the evidence showing that ineffective teachers can adversely affect 
students did not demonstrate that the tenure, dismissal, and layoff system itself creates this problem 
or leads to an unfair distribution of ineffective teachers. 
 
C. Due Process  
 
 Wilkerson v. Univ. of N. Tex., 878 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2017)  
Plaintiff, a non-tenured professor, had a one-year appointment per a contract that included 
a five-year commitment to renew at the option of the university. Plaintiff was informed by a 
university representative that the renewal provision was only included for the university’s 
convenience and would only be invoked if there was a reduction in workforce that necessitated 
non-renewals. Plaintiff was terminated and alleged that he had a property interest in his continued 
employment. The question before the court was not whether the university was within its right to 
terminate Plaintiff but rather was Plaintiff reasonable in expecting, based on rules and 
expectations, the university to employ him for the fourth year of a five-year contract? The United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas followed the reasoning in Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972), and held that Plaintiff had a 
reasonable expectation of his continued employment based on the university’s assurances and the 
context of his contract that it would exercise its option to renew each year, absent serious violations 
or a reduction in force.  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and 
found that the Sindermann case was not dispositive here, “. . . Sindermann noted that Texas law 
could still bar a teacher’s due process claim.” “Far from inviting Wilkerson ‘to feel that he has 
permanent tenure’”, citation omitted, his contract provided a one-year appointment, and the bylaws 
and caselaw warned not to expect further ones. . .” The court further noted that the district court 
overlooked the contract’s integration clause and put “informal understandings and customs” above 
the university’s officially promulgated position.  
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McAdams v. Marquette University, pet. to bypass Ct. of Apps. granted, 379 Wis. 2d 438 
(2018)  
 This pending appeal arose from a blog post written by Dr. McAdams, which criticized the 
university, other university faculty, and the actions of a graduate student/instructor. The 
administration proposed terminating Dr. McAdams. The Faculty Hearing Committee found that 
the opinions expressed by Dr. McAdams were protected by academic freedom, but that parts of 
the blog post, such as naming the graduate student/instructor, warranted a one to two-semester 
unpaid suspension, but not termination. Marquette University President Michael Lovell accepted 
the recommendation of the suspension, but also imposed a penalty, as a condition of Dr. Adams’s 
reinstatement, requiring Dr. McAdams to write a statement of apology and admission of 
wrongdoing. Dr. McAdams’s reasonable refusal to do so resulted in his de facto termination 
without due process or opportunity to contest the administration’s action. Dr. McAdams brought 
suit and claimed, inter alia, that Marquette violated his due process rights and his right to academic 
freedom. The trial court granted Marquette’s motion for summary judgment. Dr. McAdams 
appealed the trial court’s decision and the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed to bypass the Court 
of Appeals and to hear the case immediately. 
 The amicus brief argue that Marquette violated Dr. McAdams’s due process rights by 
unilaterally imposing a new penalty that required Dr. McAdams to write a statement of 
apology/admission as a condition of reinstatement. This severe sanction would compel Dr. 
McAdams to renounce his opinions, a fundamental violation of his academic freedom. It also 
amounted to a de facto termination that was imposed in contravention of the Faculty Hearing 
Committee’s recommended lesser penalty. 
 
D. Faculty Handbooks 
 
Crosby v. University of Kentucky 863 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. July 17, 2017) 
 In this case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellant’s claims. 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Richard Crosby, is a tenured Professor and former Department Chair at the 
University of Kentucky’s College of Public Health. He filed suit against the University and several 
University officials under Section 1983 and state law, claiming that his removal as Department 
Chair amounted to a violations of his right to due process. Prior to his removal, the University had 
investigated Plaintiff-Appellant for reports that he was “[v]olatile,” “explosive,” “disrespectful,” 
“condescending,” “out of control,” “prone to angry outbursts,” made an offensive remark about 
women, and that the Department’s performance was suffering because of Plaintiff-Appellant’s 
temper and hostility toward other departments. After being stripped of his Department Chair 
position, Plaintiff-Appellant appealed and demanded that the University handle his appeal under a 
proposed governing regulation not yet adopted by the University. The University declined, and 
Plaintiff-Appellant filed suit. In affirming the district court’s dismissal, the Sixth Circuit found 
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that Plaintiff-Appellant identified “no statute, formal contract, or contract implied from the 
circumstances that supports his claim to a protected property interest in his position as Chair,” and 
that the individual Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
 
V. Discrimination and Affirmative Action  
 
A. Affirmative Action in Admissions 
 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) 
The US Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of University of Texas at Austin’s 
affirmative action program. In its second consideration of Fisher’s challenge to UT’s program, the 
Court confirmed that universities must prove that race is considered only as necessary to meet the 
permissible goals of affirmative action. In particular, the university must prove that “race-neutral 
alternatives” will not suffice to meet these goals.  
In the first Fisher appeal, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 7 to 1, followed longstanding 
precedent and recognized that colleges and universities have a compelling interest in ensuring 
student body diversity, and can take account of an individual applicant’s race as one of several 
factors in their admissions program as long as the program is narrowly tailored to achieve that 
compelling interest. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)(Fisher I). The 
Supreme Court, however, ruled that the court below had not properly applied the “strict scrutiny” 
standard and remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit. In November 2013, the AAUP again 
signed onto ACE’s amicus brief to the Fifth Circuit, which reiterated the arguments enumerated 
above. In July 2014, for the second time, the Fifth Circuit upheld the UT Austin admissions 
plan. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014). Fisher petitioned to have the 
Supreme Court review the case (again) and that request was granted on June 29, 2015 the AAUP 
joined the amicus brief in Fisher II, authored by ACE and joined by thirty-seven other higher 
education organizations. 
In 2016, the US Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the UT Austin’s affirmative 
action program in Fisher II. Due to Justice Kagan’s recusal from the case and with the death of 
Justice Scalia, only seven justices took part, resulting in a 4-3 decision. Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
for the Court is significant in taking a realistic and reasonable approach that should enable 
universities to adopt affirmative action programs that meet constitutional requirements.  
The Court applied the three key criteria from its earlier decision in this case (Fisher I): (1) 
a university must show that it has a substantial purpose or interest in considering race as a factor 
in its admissions policy and that considering race is necessary to achieve this purpose; (2) courts 
should defer, though not completely, to a university’s academic judgment that there are educational 
benefits that flow from diversity in the student body; and (3) the university must prove that race-
neutral alternatives will not achieve its goals of increasing diversity.  
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The Court’s decision recognizes that judges should give due deference to universities in 
defining educational goals that include the benefits of increasing diversity in the student body, 
such as the promotion of cross-racial understanding and the preparation of students for an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society.  
The Court confirmed that universities must prove that race is considered only as necessary 
to meet the permissible goals of affirmative action. In particular, the university must prove that 
“race-neutral alternatives” will not suffice to meet these goals. This was the most controversial 
aspect of the Fisher I decision. In Fisher II, though, the Court takes a reasonable approach, finding 
that UT had sufficient evidence that its “Top Ten” admissions policy based on class rank was not 
adequate, by itself, to meet diversity goals. By adding a “holistic” evaluation of applicants who 
were not admitted in the “Top Ten” program, UT was able to consider race as one factor in a 
broader assessment of qualifications.  
The Court noted that the “prospective guidance” of its decision is limited to some extent 
by the particularities of the UT case. Despite this, the Court’s decision does provide important 
guidance to universities concerning the criteria that will be applied in evaluating affirmative action 
programs. The Court also emphasizes that universities have “a continuing obligation” to “engage 
[] in periodic reassessment of the constitutionality, and efficacy, of [their] admissions program[s].” 
While this requires ongoing study and evaluation by universities, the Court’s decision creates a 
significant and positive basis for universities to adopt affirmative action programs that meet 
constitutional requirements. 
   
B. Sexual Misconduct – Title IX  
  
Letter from Office of Civil Rights, Department of Education, (Sept. 22, 2017)  
In a Dear Colleague Letter issued on September 22, 2017 the Department of Education 
announced its withdrawal of the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter and the related 2014 "Q&A" 
guidance. The Department also issued a Q&A on Campus Sexual Misconduct and announced it 
intends to conduct a notice and comment rulemaking process. The 2017 letter and Q&A’s largely 
revert to the guidance that predated the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, though they offer certain 
specific advice that extends beyond the earlier guidance. (See companion paper by Bridget 
Maricich for further details.)   
  
Article: Aaron Nisenson, Constitutional Due Process and Title IX Investigation and 
Appeal Procedures at Colleges and Universities, 120 Penn State Law Review 963 (Spring 
2016) 
Over the last several years, the federal government has been pressing universities and 
colleges to strengthen the processes used for the investigation, discipline, and appeal of sexual 
harassment and assault cases arising under Title IX of the Education Act Amendments. Public 
sector universities and colleges are also obligated to provide to employees and students disciplined 
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for sexual harassment or assault procedural protections under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.  These disparate legal obligations have led to lawsuits alleging that universities have 
failed to comply with the Due Process Clause when discipline has been instituted as a result of 
Title IX investigations or when instituting discipline.  This article provides an overview of 
Constitutional Due Process rights and their application to public sector universities and colleges 
and will review recent judicial decisions addressing these rights in cases arising from 
investigations, discipline and appeals under Title IX.  It also includes recommendations for 
balancing need to address sexual misconduct on campus with the due process rights of students 
and employees.  
 
 
VI. Immigration  
 
A. Executive Order Banning Immigration 
 
Hawaii v. Trump, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10356 (9th Cir. June 12, 2017) cert granted 
2018 U.S. LEXIS 759 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2018) 
This pending Supreme Court appeal arose from a Ninth Circuit decision and order 
affirming in part and vacating in part the district court's preliminary injunction prohibiting the 
government from enforcing one of the President's Executive Orders on immigration. In March 
2017, the President issued Executive Order No. 13,769, which temporarily restricted foreign 
nationals of certain countries and refugees from entering into the United States. Plaintiffs brought 
suit challenging the legality of the Order. On motion by Plaintiffs, a district court preliminarily 
enjoined the federal government from enforcing Sections 2 and 6 of the Order. Defendants 
appealed, and the Ninth Circuit largely upheld the district court's ruling. The Ninth Circuit found 
that the President exceeded his authority in issuing an order excluding nationals of specified 
countries from entry into the United States since there were no adequate findings that entry of 
excluded nationals would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, that present vetting 
standards were inadequate, or that absent improved vetting procedures there likely would be harm 
to the national interests. It also held that the order improperly suspended entry of the nationals on 
the basis of their country of origin, since the order in substance operated as a prohibited 
discriminatory ban on visa issuance on the basis of nationality. Finally it ruled that restricting entry 
of refugees and decreasing the annual number of refugees who could be admitted was improper 
since there was no showing that the entry of refugees was harmful and procedures for setting the 
annual admission of refugees were disregarded.  
The Trump administration appealed the case to the US Supreme Court, which recently 
agreed to hear the case. The Trump administration argues that by preventing the President from 
implementing the travel ban, the courts have restricted the President’s ability to protect the nation, 
pointing to the possibility of inadequate information-sharing and deficient risk assessments from 
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foreign nations. Hawaii responded by emphasizing that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was not 
restrictive, but rather iterated the previously imposed limitations on the President’s authority. 
The Supreme Court will consider four questions raised in Trump v. Hawaii, 199 L.Ed.2d 
620 (U.S. 2018): Can the courts even review this challenge? Has the President overstepped his 
authority over immigration in issuing the September 24 order? Was the lower court’s ruling 
overbroad? Does the September 24 order violate the Establishment Clause? The Supreme Court 
will hear oral argument on April 25, 2018, with a decision expected to be released in late June. 
The AAUP is again considering signing onto an amicus brief authored by the American Council 
on Education contesting the Executive Order based on the arguments advanced in the first case.   
  
Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (June 26, 2017)(granting 
cert and granting stay in part), 138 S. Ct. 353 (Oct. 10, 2017)(vacating judgement as 
moot) 
 The Supreme Court case arose out of appeals from two lower court decisions addressing 
the travel ban, Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. June 12, 2017) and Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. May 25, 2017). In Hawaii v. Trump, plaintiffs 
brought suit challenging the legality of the travel ban. The federal district court preliminarily 
enjoined the federal government from enforcing certain sections of the travel ban. The government 
appealed, and the Court of the Appeals for the Ninth Circuit largely upheld the district court's 
ruling. The Ninth Circuit found that the President exceeded his authority in issuing an order 
excluding nationals of specified countries from entry into the United States since there were no 
adequate findings that entry of excluded nationals would be detrimental to the interests of the 
United States, that present vetting standards were inadequate, or that absent improved vetting 
procedures there likely would be harm to the national interests. It also held that the travel ban 
improperly suspended entry of the nationals on the basis of their country of origin, since the travel 
ban in substance operated as a prohibited discriminatory ban on visa issuance on the basis of 
nationality. Finally, it ruled that restricting entry of refugees and decreasing the annual number of 
refugees who could be admitted was improper since there was no showing that the entry of refugees 
was harmful and procedures for setting the annual admission of refugees were disregarded. 
 In Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, after the district court concluded that 
Plaintiffs had standing to sue, it found that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their 
Establishment Clause claim and issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the travel 
ban. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the political 
branches' plenary power over immigration is subject to constitutional limitations and that, "Where 
plaintiffs have seriously called into question whether the stated reason for the challenged action 
was provided in good faith," courts are required to look beyond that stated, facially legitimate 
rationale for evidence the rationale is not genuine. In this case, the court examined the travel ban 
in the context of statements made by the president during the 2016 campaign season and found 
that it "drip[ped] with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination." The court held that the 
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preliminary injunction was proper because it could likely be shown that the Muslim travel ban 
violated the Establishment Clause because its primary purpose was religious, based on evidence 
that it was motivated by the President's desire to exclude Muslims from the United States. The 
court also rejected the government’s reliance on allegations of harm to national security interests 
finding they did not outweigh the competing harm of the likely constitutional violation and because 
it was plausibly alleged that the stated national security purpose was provided in bad faith. 
 The Supreme Court of the United States consolidated these cases and on June 26, 2017, 
the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for writ of certiorari and issued a brief 
opinion allowing the government to enforce the Muslim travel ban, with an exception for travelers 
and refugees who have a “credible claim” of a genuine relationship with an individual or institution 
in the United States. When that relationship is with an institution, the relationship must be a 
genuine one, rather than one created just to get around the Muslim travel ban. 
 On September 18, 2017, the AAUP joined with the American Council on Education and 
other higher education associations, in an amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court that opposes the 
travel ban. The brief specifically noted the harm to faculty: “From the moment [travel ban] was 
signed, . . . [f]aculty recruits were . . . deterred from accepting teaching and research positions. 
And scholars based abroad pulled out of academic conferences in the United States, either because 
they were directly affected by the [travel ban] or because they are concerned about the [travel 
ban’s] harmful impact on academic discourse and research worldwide.”  It is difficult to overstate 
the importance of conferences, colloquia, and symposia to scholarly communication. They enable 
intellectual give-and take and real-time digestion and discussion of research. Conferences also 
allow for in-person encounters and discussions that give rise to important future collaborations.” 
 The brief concluded “American colleges and universities ‘have a mission of ‘global 
engagement’ and rely on . . . visiting students, scholars, and faculty to advance their educational 
goals.’ Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1160 (9Th Cir. 2017). That vital mission cannot be 
achieved if American immigration policy no longer sends a welcoming message to the members 
of the international community who wish to enter our campus gates. As explained above, the 
[travel ban] jeopardizes the many contributions that foreign students, scholars, and researchers 
make to American colleges and universities, as well as our nation’s economy and general well-
being.”   
 The travel ban expired by its own terms in late 2017. Therefore, on October 10, 2017, the 
Court vacated the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and remanded the case with instructions to 
dismiss the case as moot due to the September 24, 2017 expiration of certain parts of the travel 
ban. Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 353 (Oct. 10, 2017)(vacating judgement 
as moot). On October 24, 2017, vacated the judgement of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case 
with instructions to dismiss the case as moot due to the October 24, 2017 expiration of another 
provision of the travel ban. Trump v. Hawaii, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6367, 199 L. Ed. 2d 275, (Oct. 24 
2017)(vacating judgement as moot.) 
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VII. Collective Bargaining Cases and Issues – Private Sector 
 
A. NLRB Authority  
 
1. Religiously Affiliated Institutions 
 
Pacific Lutheran Univ. & SEIU, Local 925, 361 N.L.R.B. 157 (2014) 
 In this case the National Labor Relations Board published a significant decision expanding 
the organizing rights of private-sector faculty members. The Board modified the standards used to 
determine two important issues affecting the ability of faculty members at private-sector higher 
education institutions to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act: first, whether certain 
institutions and their faculty members are exempted from coverage of the Act due to their religious 
activities; and second, whether certain faculty members are managers, who are excluded from 
protection of the Act. (see infra) However, both holdings may be overturned by a newly constituted 
Board.  
 In its decision the NLRB ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petitioned for faculty 
members, even though they were employed at a religious institution. The question of whether 
faculty members in religious institutions are subject to jurisdiction and coverage of the Act has 
long been a significant issue, with the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Catholic Bishops serving 
as the foundation for any analysis. In Pacific Lutheran University, the Board established a two-
part test for determining jurisdiction. First, whether “as a threshold matter, [the university] holds 
itself out as providing a religious educational environment”; and if so, then, second, whether “it 
holds out the petitioned-for faculty members as performing a specific role in creating or 
maintaining the school’s religious educational environment.” 
 The employer and its supporters argued that only the threshold question of whether the 
university was a bona fide religious institution was relevant, in which case the Act would not apply 
to any faculty members. The Board responded that this argument “overreaches because it focuses 
solely on the nature of the institution, without considering whether the petitioned-for faculty 
members act in support of the school’s religious mission.” Therefore, the Board established a 
standard that examines whether faculty members play a role in supporting the school’s religious 
environment. 
 In so doing, the Board recognized concerns that inquiry into faculty members’ individual 
duties in religious institutions may involve examining the institution’s religious beliefs, which 
could intrude on the institution’s First Amendment rights. To avoid this issue the new standard 
focuses on what the institution “holds out” with respect to faculty members. The Board explained, 
“We shall decline jurisdiction if the university ‘holds out’ its faculty members, in communications 
to current or potential students and faculty members, and the community at large, as performing a 
specific role in creating or maintaining the university’s religious purpose or mission.” 
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 The Board also found that that faculty must be “held out as performing a specific religious 
function,” such as integrating the institution’s religious teachings into coursework or engaging in 
religious indoctrination (emphasis in original). This would not be satisfied by general statements 
that faculty are to support religious goals, or that they must adhere to an institution’s commitment 
to diversity or academic freedom. Applying this standard, the Board found that while Pacific 
Lutheran University held itself out as providing a religious educational environment, the 
petitioned-for faculty members were not performing a specific religious function. Therefore, the 
Board asserted jurisdiction and turned to the question of whether certain of the faculty members 
were managerial employees.  
However, this holding is very susceptible to reversal by a newly constituted Board, and the 
holding drew dissents from both Republican members of the Board.  The NLRB would not be able 
to modify PLU until one or more cases with these issues come to the Board on appeal. In recent 
unfair labor practice cases, the Board rejected attempts by several religiously affiliated universities 
to overturn earlier election decisions where the Board asserted jurisdiction. See Xavier University, 
Case 3–CA–204564 (NLRB March 9, 2018). However, these were generally procedural rulings 
that do not portend the Board affirming the Pacific Lutheran standard substantively. One of these 
cases involving Duquesne University was recently appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Court may address the standard there. Duquesne v. 
NLRB, appeal docketed, No.18-1063 (D.C. Cir. March 1, 2018). 
 
2. Faculty as Managers   
 
Pacific Lutheran Univ. & SEIU, Local 925, 361 N.L.R.B. 157 (2014) 
 In this case the National Labor Relations Board published a significant decision expanding 
the organizing rights of private-sector faculty members. The Board modified the standards used to 
determine two important issues affecting the ability of faculty members at private-sector higher 
education institutions to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act: first, whether certain 
institutions and their faculty members are exempted from coverage of the Act due to their religious 
activities (see supra); and second, whether certain faculty members are managers, who are 
excluded from protection of the Act. In addressing this second issue, the Board specifically 
highlighted, as AAUP had in its amicus brief submitted in the case, the increasing corporatization 
of the university. However, this holding is susceptible to reversal under a newly constituted Board. 
 This case started when faculty members at Pacific Lutheran University petitioned for an 
election to be represented by a union. The university challenged the decision to hold the election, 
claiming that some or all of the faculty members were managers and therefore ineligible for union 
representation. The NLRB Regional Director ruled in favor of the union and found that the faculty 
in question do not have enough managerial authority to be precluded from unionizing. Pacific 
Lutheran asked the NLRB to overturn this ruling. The NLRB invited briefs from interested parties 
on the questions regarding whether university faculty members seeking to be represented by a 
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union are employees covered by the National Labor Relations Act or excluded as managers and 
whether the NLRB has jurisdiction over faculty members at religious educational institutions. 
 In March 2014, the AAUP submitted an amicus brief urging the NLRB to consider the full 
context when determining whether faculty at private colleges are managerial. The brief described 
the significant changes in university hierarchical and decision-making models since the US 
Supreme Court ruled in 1980 that faculty at Yeshiva University were managerial employees and 
thus ineligible to unionize. The AAUP brief urged the NLRB to consider, when determining the 
managerial status of faculty, factors such as the extent of university administration hierarchy, the 
extent to which the administration makes academic decisions based on market-based 
considerations, the degree of consultation by the administration with faculty governance bodies, 
whether the administration treats faculty recommendations as advisory rather than as effective 
recommendations, whether the administration routinely approves nearly all faculty 
recommendations without independent administrative review, and whether conflict between the 
administration and the faculty reflects a lack of alignment of administration and faculty interests. 
 In its decision the NLRB ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petitioned for faculty 
members, even though they were employed at a religious institution, and that the faculty members 
were not managers. This second question arises from the Supreme Court’s decision in Yeshiva, 
where the Court found that in certain circumstances faculty may be considered “managers” who 
are excluded from the protections of the Act. The Board noted that the application 
of Yeshiva previously involved an open-ended and uncertain set of criteria for making decisions 
regarding whether faculty were managers. This led to significant complications in determining 
whether the test was met and created uncertainty for all of the parties. 
 Further, in explaining the need for the new standard, the Board specifically highlighted, as 
AAUP had in its amicus brief, the increasing corporatization of the university. The Board stated, 
“Indeed our experience applying Yeshiva has generally shown that colleges and universities are 
increasingly run by administrators, which has the effect of concentrating and centering authority 
away from the faculty in a way that was contemplated in Yeshiva, but found not to exist at Yeshiva 
University itself. Such considerations are relevant to our assessment of whether the faculty 
constitute managerial employees.” 
 In Pacific Lutheran, the Board sought to create a simpler framework for determining 
whether faculty members served as managers. The Board explained that under the new standard, 
“where a party asserts that university faculty are managerial employees, we will examine the 
faculty’s participation in the following areas of decision making: academic programs, enrollment 
management, finances, academic policy, and personnel policies and decisions.” The Board will 
give greater weight to the first three areas, as these are “areas of policy making that affect the 
university as whole.” The Board “will then determine, in the context of the university’s decision 
making structure and the nature of the faculty’s employment relationship with the university, 
whether the faculty actually control or make effective recommendation over those areas. If they 
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do, we will find that they are managerial employees and, therefore, excluded from the Act’s 
protections.” 
 The Board emphasized that to be found managers, faculty must in fact have actual control 
or make effective recommendations over policy areas. This requires that “the party asserting 
managerial status must prove actual—rather than mere paper—authority. . . . A faculty handbook 
may state that the faculty has authority over or responsibility for a particular decision-making area, 
but it must be demonstrated that the faculty exercises such authority in fact.” Proof requires 
“specific evidence or testimony regarding the nature and number of faculty decisions or 
recommendations in a particular decision making area, and the subsequent review of those 
decisions or recommendations, if any, by the university administration prior to implementation, 
rather than mere conclusory assertions that decisions or recommendations are generally followed.” 
Further, the Board used strong language in defining “effective” as meaning that “recommendations 
must almost always be followed by the administration” or “routinely become operative without 
independent review by the administration.” 
 
University of Southern California v. National Labor Relations Board, appeal docketed, 
No. 17-1149 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
 This case arose when SEIU filed a petition to represent non-tenure-track full-time and part-
time faculty in two colleges within USC. USC objected to the petition arguing that the faculty were 
managers under Yeshiva. The Board applied the test established in Pacific Lutheran 
University, 361 NLRB 1404 (2014) (in which AAUP had also filed an amicus brief) and found 
that the faculty in the units were not managerial and therefore were eligible to unionize. After the 
union won the election in the Roski School of Art and Design, USC refused to bargain citing its 
objection, and the Board ordered USC to bargain. USC appealed to the US Court of Appeals for 
the DC Circuit arguing that the faculty had no right to unionize as they were managerial 
employees.  
 The AAUP submitted an amicus brief December 28, 2017 to the US Court of Appeals for 
the DC Circuit urging the Court to uphold the NLRB’s determination that non-tenure-track faculty 
at USC are not managerial employees. The brief supported the legal framework established by the 
NLRB in Pacific Lutheran University and describes in detail the significant changes in university 
hierarchical and decision-making models since the US Supreme Court ruled in 1980 that faculty 
at Yeshiva University were managerial employees and thus ineligible to unionize under the 
National Labor Relations Act. Specifically, the Board concluded that USC had not proven that 
non-tenure-track faculty actually exercise control or make effective recommendations about 
policies that affect the university as a whole. The brief focused on the fundamental structural and 
operational changes in universities during the more than three decades since NLRB v. Yeshiva 
University. Universities have adopted a corporate model of decision-making and employment 
relations that has reduced faculty authority in university policy-making and has created conflicts 
of interests between faculty and university administrations. Rather than relying on faculty expertise 
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and recommendations, the growing ranks of university administrators have engaged increasingly 
in unilateral top-down decision-making, often influenced by considerations of external market 
forces and revenue generation. At the same time, universities have cut back on tenure-track/tenured 
positions and greatly expanded non-tenure-track faculty positions. Under these conditions, 
universities’ assertions that faculty are managerial are often based only on “paper authority” rather 
than actual authority or effective recommendations by faculty in university policy-making. 
   
3. Graduate Assistants Right to Organize 
 
Columbia University, 364 N.L.R.B. 90 (2016)  
Echoing arguments made by the AAUP in an amicus brief, the National Labor Relations 
Board held that student assistants working at private colleges and universities are statutory 
employees covered by the National Labor Relations Act. The 3–1 decision overrules a 2004 
decision in Brown University, which had found that graduate assistants were not employees and 
therefore did not have statutory rights to unionize. However, this decision is susceptible to reversal 
under a newly constituted Board.  
The AAUP filed an amicus brief with the Board arguing that extending collective 
bargaining rights to student employees promotes academic freedom and does not harm faculty-
student mentoring relationships, and instead would reflect the reality that the student employees 
were performing the work of the university when fulfilling their duties. In reversing Brown, the 
majority said that the earlier decision “deprived an entire category of workers of the protections of 
the Act without a convincing justification.” The Board found that granting collective bargaining 
rights to student employees would not infringe on First Amendment academic freedom and, citing 
the AAUP amicus brief, would not seriously harm the ability of universities to function. The Board 
also relied on the AAUP amicus brief when it found that the duties of graduate assistant constituted 
work for the university and were not primarily educational. 
The AAUP decided to file an amicus brief in this case in keeping with its long history of 
support for the unionization of graduate assistants. The AAUP has previously filed numerous 
amicus briefs arguing the graduate assistants are employees with rights to unionize under the 
NLRA, has issued statements affirming the rights of graduate assistants to unionize, and has an 
active committee on graduate students and professional employees that represents the interests of 
graduate students. The AAUP brief in this case addressed the two questions involving the Brown 
decision. The brief argued that graduate assistants, including those working on federal grant funded 
research, are employees with the right to unionize under the NLRA and it refuted the Brown 
decision’s speculative claims that collective bargaining would compromise academic freedom and 
the cooperative relationships between faculty mentors and their graduate student mentees. 
In its decision, the Board held that graduate assistants, and other student teaching and 
research assistants, are employees with a right to unionize. In doing so the Board echoed arguments 
made by the AAUP and specifically cited the AAUP amicus brief. First the Board found, as AAUP 
had argued, that the unionization of graduate students would not infringe upon First Amendment 
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academic freedom. The Board explained that “there is little, if any, basis here to conclude that 
treating employed graduate students as employees under the Act would raise serious constitutional 
questions, much less violate the First Amendment.” Id. at 7. 
The Board next found that experience with graduate student unions, primarily in the public 
sector, had demonstrated that unionization did not seriously harm the ability of universities to 
function. The Board stated, “As AAUP notes in its amicus brief, many of its unionized faculty 
chapters’ collective-bargaining agreements expressly refer to and quote the AAUP’s 1940 
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, which provides a framework that has 
proven mutually agreeable to many unions and universities.”Id. at 10, footnote 82. Therefore, the 
Board found that “there is no compelling reason—in theory or in practice—to conclude that 
collective bargaining by student assistants cannot be viable or that it would seriously interfere with 
higher education.” Id. at 12. 
Finally, the Board also found that the duties of teaching assistants constituted work for the 
institutions. The Board noted that “teaching assistants frequently take on a role akin to that of 
faculty, the traditional purveyors of a university’s instructional output.”  In doing so, the Board 
again cited to the AAUP’s amicus brief. “As the American Association of University Professors, 
an organization that represents professional faculty—the very careers that many graduate students 
aspire to—states in its brief, teaching abilities acquired through teaching assistantships are of 
relatively slight benefit in the attainment of a career in higher education.” Id. at 16, footnote 104. 
Despite the instability that this would add to the NLRB’s precedents, a newly constituted 
NLRB could overrule Columbia University and return to the Brown University holding that 
graduate assistants are not employees under the NLRA. In Columbia, Miscimarra filed a vigorous 
dissent arguing that the Board’s earlier decision and reasoning in Brown were correct. Id. at 24-
25. Miscimarra explained his broader disagreement with the Board’s decision. 
 
I disagree with my colleagues' decision to apply the Act to college and university 
student assistants. In my view, this change is unsupported by our statute, and it is ill-
advised based on substantial considerations, including those that far outweigh whether 
students can engage in collective bargaining  over the terms and conditions of education-
related positions while attempting to earn an undergraduate  or graduate  [*112]  degree. 
The Supreme Court has stated that "the authority structure of a university does not 
fit neatly within the statutory scheme" set forth in the NLRA. NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 
444 U.S. 672, 680, 100 S. Ct. 856, 63 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1980). Likewise, the Board has 
recognized that a university, which relies so heavily on collegiality, "does not square with 
the traditional authority structures with which this Act was designed to cope in the typical 
organizations of the commercial world." Adelphi University, 195 NLRB at 648. The 
obvious distinction here has been recognized by the Supreme Court and the Board: the 
lecture hall is not the factory floor, and the "industrial model cannot be imposed blindly on 
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the academic world." Syracuse University, 204 NLRB 641, 643 (1973); see also Yeshiva, 
444 U.S. at 680. 
 
Id. at 24. Miscimarra then expressed his disagreement with several particular aspects of the 
Board’s decision. Miscimarra concluded, “For these reasons, and consistent with the Board's prior 
holding in Brown University, I believe the Board should find that the relationship between 
Columbia and the student assistants in the petitioned-for  unit in this matter is primarily 
educational,  and that student assistants are not employees under Section 2(3) of the Act.” Id. at 
34.  
Unions representing graduate student employees have withdrawn pending NLRB petitions 
and charges, and are not filing new petitions or charges, which would result in the NLRB not 
having the opportunity to review and reverse or modify the Columbia University decision. 
Therefore, it appears that there are not currently any pending cases before the NLRB that would 
allow the NLRB to overrule Columbia University. However, it is possible that such a case could 
reach the NLRB. 
 
 
B. Bargaining Units 
 
Yale Univ. & Unite Here Local 33, 365 N.L.R.B. 40 (2017); PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 
N.L.R.B. 160 (2017) 
Another area in which there has recently been significant change is in the standard for 
determining the appropriate bargaining unit for collective bargaining. In Specialty Healthcare & 
Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 NLRB 934 (2011), the Board reviewed and clarified its 
standards for making unit determinations when a representation petition is filed.  However, in PCC 
Structurals, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 160 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 15, 2017) the new Board overruled Specialty 
Health Care, throwing into question recent decisions of the Board on bargaining units at colleges 
and universities.  
In Yale Univ. & Unite Here Local 33, 365 NLRB No. 40 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 22, 2017), the 
NLRB applied the Specialty Healthcare standard and approved an election for graduate students 
in nine separate units. Yale contended both that the graduate students were not employees, 
asserting both that the Board’s earlier Columbia University decision was wrongly decided, and 
alternatively even under that standard the graduate students were not employees.  
At Yale, the union “filed nine petitions, each of which seeks to represent separate 
bargaining units composed of all teaching fellows, discussion section leaders, part-time acting 
instructors (PTAIs), associates in teaching, lab leaders, grader/tutors, graders without contact, and 
teaching assistants (referred to collectively as teaching fellows) who teach in each of nine 
departments at Yale University (Yale or the University). The nine separate units would include 
teaching fellows in the following departments: English, East Asian Languages and Literature, 
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History, History of Art, Political Science, Sociology, Physics, Geology and Geophysics, and 
Mathematics.” Yale University, (01-RC183014) Boston MA (Reg. 1 Jan. 25, 2017). 
The Regional Director summarized the standard used to determine whether a proposed unit 
was appropriate.  
 
In Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 NLRB 934 (2011), 
enforced sub nom. Kindred Nursing Centers East, LLC v. NLRB, 727 F.3d 552 (6thCir. 
2013), the Board set forth the standard to be applied when an employer contends that the 
smallest appropriate unit contains employees who are not in the petitioned-for unit. When 
a petitioned-for unit consists of employees who are readily identifiable as a group, and the 
Board finds that the employees in the group share a community of interest after considering 
the traditional criteria, the Board will find the petitioned-for unit to be an appropriate unit, 
despite a contention that employees in the group could be placed in a larger unit which 
would also be appropriate or even more appropriate, unless the party so contending 
demonstrates that employees in the larger unit share an overwhelming community of 
interest with those in the petitioned-for unit. Id. at 945-946. 
 
Id. at 28-29. 
Applying these standards, The Regional Director found that nine proposed units were 
appropriate. The Regional Director rejected Yale’s argument that individual units were not 
appropriate, and instead a university wide unit would be appropriate, explaining, “while a 
university wide unit might also be appropriate, I find that Yale has failed to meet its burden of 
demonstrating that there is such an overwhelming community of interest among all of the teaching 
fellows at the University that there is no rational basis for approving units based on academic 
departments.”  Id. at 36. 
Yale filed a request for expedited review of the Regional Director's Decision and Direction 
of Election, a request to stay the elections. Yale Univ. & Unite Here Local 33, 365 NLRB No. 40 
(N.L.R.B. Feb. 22, 2017). The Board denied these requests. Miscimarra filed a dissent which 
highlighted several disagreements with the Board’s current rulings and procedures. Miscimarra 
addressed the issue of the appropriateness of the unit expressing his disagreement with the 
Specialty Health care standard in general, and his view that “the instant case also gives rise to 
questions regarding the appropriateness of applying the Board's Specialty Healthcare standard in 
a university setting.”  
On December 15, 2017, one day before Chairman Philip A. Miscimarra’s term on the board 
expired, the Board issued PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 160 (N.L.R.B. December 15, 
2017), which overruled Specialty Healthcare and reinstated the prior community-of-interest 
standard for determining an appropriate bargaining unit in union representation cases. Newly 
appointed members Marvin E. Kaplan (R) and William J. Emanuel (R) joined Miscimarra in the 
3-2 decision. This important decision was issued without the normal request for amicus briefs, and 
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it was followed by a NLRB General Counsel Memorandum, OM 18-05, that specifies that 
employers will be allowed to raise issues with previously determined or agreed to bargaining units.  
On December 19, 2017, regional director Dennis Walsh, applied the Board’s new standard 
to an election petition involving graduate students at the University of Pennsylvania. University of 
Pennsylvania, 04-RC-199609 (NLRB Reg. 4, Dec. 19, 2017). The Regional Director outlined the 
legal standard under PCC Structurals. 
 
The Act requires only that a petitioner seek representation of employees in an 
appropriate unit, not in the most appropriate unit possible. Overnite Transportation Co., 
322 NLRB 723 (1996). Thus, the Board first determines whether the unit proposed by a 
petitioner is appropriate. When the Board determines that the employees in the unit sought 
by a petitioner share a community of interest, the Board must next evaluate whether the 
interests of that group are “sufficiently distinct from those of other [excluded] employees 
to warrant establishment of a separate unit.” PCC Structurals, 365 NLRB No. 160, slip op. 
at 7 (Dec. 15, 2017) quoting Wheeling Island Gaming, 355 NLRB 637, 642 fn. 2 (2010) 
(emphasis in original). Specifically, the inquiry is whether “’excluded employees have 
meaningfully distinct interests in the context of collective bargaining that outweigh 
similarities with unit members.’” PCC Structurals, supra, slip op. at 11, quoting 
Constellation Brands, U.S. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, 842 F.3d 784, 794 (2d Cir. 2016). In 
making this assessment, PCC Structurals instructs the decision-maker to assess [w]hether 
the employees are organized into a separate department; have distinct skills and training; 
have distinct job functions and perform distinct work, including inquiry into the amount 
and type of job overlap between classifications; are functionally integrated with the 
Employer’s other employees; have frequent contact with other employees; interchange 
with other employees; have distinct terms and conditions of employment; and are 
separately supervised. Id., slip op. at 5 (quoting United Operations, Inc., 338 NLRB 123, 
123 (2002). Particularly important in considering whether the unit sought is appropriate are 
the organization of the facility and the utilization of skills. Gustave Fisher, Inc., 256 NLRB 
1069, 1069 fn. 5 (1981). However, all relevant factors must be weighed in determining 
community of interest.  
 
Id. at 21. 
Applying these standards, Walsh directed that students from the business and engineering 
schools — who were previously excluded — must also be included in the bargaining unit: 
 
based on the record and relevant Board cases, including the Board’s recently minted 
decision in PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 160 (Dec. 15, 2017) overturning 
Specialty Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 NLRB 934 (2011), enfd. 
727 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2013), I find, in agreement with the Employer, that a unit limited to 
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graduate student employees in the seven petitioned-for schools is not appropriate, and that 
to constitute an appropriate unit it must also include graduate students in both the Wharton 
School and the School of Engineering and Applied Science because the interests of the 
former group are not sufficiently distinct from those of the latter group to warrant a separate 
unit. 
 
Id. at 2. 
In February 2018 the union in the University of Pennsylvania case withdrew its election 
petition and therefore the Board will not address the bargaining unit standard in this case.  
  
C. NLRB Elections 
 
NLRB Election Rules, 29 CFR Parts 101, 102, and 103; Request for Information 
Regarding Representation Election Regulations, RIN 3142-AA12 (NLRB Dec. 14, 2017) 
In December 2014 the NLRB issued revisions to union election rules that vastly simplified 
and expedited the election process. However, this election rule may be retracted or changed by the 
new Board based on a recent Request for Information.  
On December 15, 2014, the Board published the Election Rule, which amended the Board’s 
prior Election Regulations.  79 Fed. Reg. 74308 (2014).  The Election Rule was adopted after 
public comment periods in which tens of thousands of public comments were received.  The Rule 
was approved by a three-member Board majority, with two Board members dissenting.  Thereafter, 
the Rule was submitted for review by Congress pursuant to the Congressional Review Act.  In 
March 2015, majorities in both houses of Congress voted in favor of a joint resolution disapproving 
the Board’s rule and declaring that it should have no force or effect.  President Obama vetoed this 
resolution on March 31, 2015.  The amendments adopted by the final rule became effective on 
April 14, 2015, and have been applicable to all representation cases filed on or after that date. 
Lawsuits challenging the facial validity of the Election Rule were rejected with the Courts finding 
that the changes were not arbitrary or capricious and did not violate federal statutes or the 
Constitution. See Associated Builders and Contractors of Texas, Inc. v. NLRB, 826 F.3d 215, 218 
(5th Cir. 2016) (The “rule, on its face, does not violate the National Labor Relations Act or the 
Administrative Procedure Act[.]”); Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. 
NLRB, 118 F. Supp. 3d 171, 220 (D.D.C. 2015) (rejecting claims that the Final Rule contravenes 
either the NLRA or the Constitution or is arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of the Board’s 
discretion).  
The 2014 Election Rule includes the following: Provides for electronic filing and 
transmission of election petitions and other documents; Ensures that employees, employers and 
unions receive timely information they need to understand and participate in the representation 
case process; Eliminates or reduces unnecessary litigation, duplication and delay; Adopts best 
practices and uniform procedures across regions; Requires that additional contact information 
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(personal telephone numbers and email addresses) be included in voter lists, to the extent that 
information is available to the employer, in order to enhance information sharing by permitting 
other parties to the election to communicate with voters about the election; and Allows parties to 
consolidate all election-related appeals to the Board into a single appeals process. Cumulatively, 
these changes will likely reduce the time from the filing of a representation petition to the holding 
of an election to between 10 and 20 days. 
Some of the new provisions are particularly important for faculty members. For example, 
the new election rules also require that employers provide the union with personal email addresses 
and phone numbers for employees. This is particularly important for reaching out to contingent 
faculty, who often perform most of their work off campus.  Also, parties must be aware that the 
NLRB representation hearing and election process is extremely fast paced and the NLRB will 
rarely grant requests for extensions of time. Therefore, parties should be fully aware of the revised 
rules and prepared for the hearing and election process prior to filing any election petition with the 
NLRB.  
However, a recent Request for Information issued by the Board indicates the Board may 
modify or rescind the 2014 election rule. On December 14, 2017, the National Labor Relations 
Board published a Request for Information in the Federal Register, asking for public input 
regarding the Board’s 2014 Election Rule, which modified the Board’s representation-election 
procedures located at 29 CFR parts 101 and 102. The Board sought information from interested 
parties regarding three questions: 
1. Should the 2014 Election Rule be retained without change? 
2. Should the 2014 Election Rule be retained with modifications? If so, what should be 
modified? 
3. Should the 2014 Election Rule be rescinded? If so, should the Board revert to the 
Representation Election Regulations that were in effect prior to the 2014 Election Rule’s 
adoption, or should the Board make changes to the prior Representation Election 
Regulations? If the Board should make changes to the prior Representation Election 
Regulations, what should be changed? 
Responses to this request were originally due on February 12, 2018, but the deadline was 
subsequently extended to Wednesday, April 18, 2018.  
 The Request for Information was approved by former Board Chairman Philip A. 
Miscimarra and Board Members Marvin E. Kaplan (now Chairman) and William J. Emanuel. 
Board Members Mark Gaston Pearce and Lauren McFerran dissented.  The majority noted that the 
request “does not suggest even a single specific change in current representation election 
procedures.” Id. at 3. However, member McFerren in a dissent argued that “the nature and timing 
of this [request], along with its faulty justifications, suggests that the majority’s interest lies  . . . in 
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manufacturing a rationale for a subsequent rollback of the Rule in light of the change in the 
composition of the Board.” Id. at 11. 
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